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MURDERING STATISTICAL LIVES . . . ?' 
Joanne Linnerooth 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The public appears to prefer saving known persons in present and 
serious peril over averting future dangers to persons yet unknown. The 
identifiable life--the coal miner trapped in a collapsed mine, the mountain 
climber stranded in a blizzard, a little girl in need of an operation--seem 
deserving of special priority over th.e statistical life--highway deaths, 
cancer deaths--occurring a t  some time in the future. But a question 
rarely asked is whether public emotions are aroused so much by the 
knowledge of a person's identity as by the knowledge that someone, who- 
ever it may be, is in serious peril. Does not a ship lost at  sea inspire the 
'The author acknowledges the valuable comments made by Howard Kunreuther, Michiel 
Jones-Lee, Gavin Mooney, and James Vaupel on earlier drafts of this paper. 
same response regardless of the existence of a passenger list? As Broome 
(1978) asks in h s  provocative article on this subject, "if a definite number 
of people are going to die, can it really make such a vast difference 
whether or not it is known for certain who they are?" (p.92). 
Framing the issue in t h s  way, the problem of allocating funds for the 
identifiable person in serious peril at  the cost of saving statistical lives is 
but an extreme rendition of a more general, and possibly more impor- 
tant.' social dilemma concerning the distribution of the risk of early 
death over populations, none of which are so small that the victims are ez 
ante identifiable. Though the identity of the person, his name and his 
face, is undoubtedly a contributing factor to the disproportionate public 
response, the desire on the part of the public to spread or equalize the 
risk of early death among its members may be an equally important con- 
tributing factor. The problem, then, goes beyond the identifiable death 
and concerns the more general issue of allocating resources among sta- 
tistical deaths, where placing priority on high-risk situations, thus pro- 
moting "risk equity," may be at  the cost of "efficiency," or saving fewer 
lives in the total. 3 
'1t is questionable whether society is, in fact, allocating more to save the identifiable life. 
According to Schwing (1070) the average cost per life year saved for kidney transplant, home 
dialysis, and highway rescue cars is $10,000, $50,000, and $40,000 respectively. These sums 
can be compared with the figure put on a statistical life by the U.S. government which 
Sanges from $300,000 to $1 million. 
In this paper, I shall not be dealing with the problem of distributing risks in its entirety 
since I have chosen not to include one intriguing aspect, the catastrophic risk. Though the 
problem of placing priority on risks effecting many people a t  one time and in one place are 
in some ways aimilar, and in some ways importantly different, to  the equity problem defined 
here, scope of this paper will be limited to  the latter. For good discussions of the c a t a s  
trophic event, see Lathrop (1981). Keeney (1080), and Bodily (1978). A related issue is the 
catastrophic loss to the individual. In this regard, one area of investigation concerns the 
decision processes of individuals fortheir protection against events which have a relatively 
small chance of occurrence, but that can result in severe personal losses. For imtance, Kun- 
reuther (1079) has looked into this question in the context of determining appropriate public 
policy with respect to subsidized insurance policies and disaster relief for individuals in 
areas of potential natural disaster. He has more recently expanded this work t o  include 
technological hazards (Kunreuther lD8O). 
To illustrate, consider the following problem: 
An oil-fired electricity-generating plant is being planned for con- 
struction. Though the plant will supply the electricity needs of a 
distant city, it is not without risks to the local population. The 
air of the region surrounding the plant will be polluted. In addi- 
tion, the workers at  the plant will be exposed to high safety 
risks. The per-capita risk from the air pollution is calculated to 
be smaller than that  from the occupational hazards, but 
because the pollution affects a greater population, the life years 
lost are expected to be hgher .  The budget permits only one of 
two equally costly expenditures: scrubbers to clean up the air 
or  a series of on-site improvements to  reduce the occupational 
risks. 
Keeney (1978) has stated the dilemma of deciding which population 
should receive priority as depending on whether "risk equity" is a desir- 
able aspect of the public's value structure for evaluating risks. Borrowing 
his notation, the problem can more generally be stated as a choice of 
awarding priority between the  following two risk profiles (assuming 
independent probabilities) 
where in the first po.pulation of t en  people, two are facing a 0.10 risk t o  
their lives from some specified cause, and in the second population of ten  
people, four are  facing a 0.05 risk to  their lives again from a specified 
cause. The question is whether the policy maker does or should follow a 
strict efficiency strategy, in which case he would be indifferent between 
mitigating the risks from either cause, or whether equity considerations 
do or should play a role in his decisions, in which case he might prefer 
mitigating the higher risks facing fewer people. 
Striving for efficiency, or attempting to spare as few lives in the total 
as possible has long been recognized as a desirable goal.4 The question of 
how the government might reallocate resources in meeting this goal 
remains topical among policy analysts. In a recent survey of 57 lifesaving 
programs in the United States, Graham and Vaupel (1980) have revealed 
striking disparities across agencies and programs in the cost per life year 
saved. For example, a recent standard set by the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration on the use of acrylonitrile is estimated to save 
a life a t  the cost of $11 million which can be compared, for example, to 
mandatory passive seat belts in automobiles which are estimated to save 
a life a t  the cost of $88. The question is how relevant are the distribution 
of the risks in making these shf ts .  This question of equity versus effi- 
ciency lies a t  the core of the preventive versus curative debate in the 
medical community. 
A good example of t h s  equity-efficiency dilemma in practice can be 
found in the area of radiation protection. The measure of radiation expo- 
sure is the person ram, or, more recently. the man-sievert5, whch  is the 
exposure of one person to  one rem (sievert), 100 people to 0.1 rems 
(sieverts) each or 10' people to lo-' rems (sieverts) each, and so on. 
4~ plea for the rationale allocation of public money for government policies intended to save 
lives was made in 1963 by Carlson, who argued for economic efficiency in allocating the pub- 
lic pie among competing health and safety programs. He showed that a death on the high- 
way could be prevented for a cost as low as $1,099; whereas, the U.S Air Force was spending 
on the B-58 capsule ejection system $9 million to prevent a death. Though Carlson was one of 
the first to  argue for a fked value on a life to promote allocative efficiency, he was not the 
first t o  propose a dollar value on a human life. Sir William Petty (1683) calculated "80 
pounds sterling to be the value of each head of man, woman, and child, and of adult persons 
twice as much; from where we may learn to compute the loss we have sustained by the 
plague, by the slaughter of men in war, and by sending them abroad into the service of 
foreign princes," @. 136). It is impossible in any true sense to measure human life in terms of 
dollars and cents," (p.124). For a review of the more recent literature, see Linnerooth (1975, 
&We), Acton (1976) and Mooney (1977). 
The ma~s ieve r t  is equal to 100 person rems. 
Since it is usually assumed (but by no means proven) that the probability 
of dying from a latent cancer is some linear function of exposure, the 
expected deaths from one person rem or one man-sievert is independent 
of how it is distributed, or independent of the size of the irradiated popu- 
lation. In a 1974 U.S Environmental Agency Report, Tompkins states the 
radiation protection dilemma as what population should get priority 
attention: the one with the highest per-capita exposure or the one with 
the largest person rems? 
Since publication of this E.P.A. report, the concept of a cost to a per- 
son rem has received a great deal of attention. As pointed out by Jones- 
Lee (19BO), the U.K. National Radiation Protection Board has argued for 
an increasing relationship between the cost of a man-sievert and the per- 
capita dose. By giving priority to the population with the highest per- 
capita exposure the NRPB has, in effect, made an implicit statement 
rejecting "deaths averted" as a policy goal. Preventing high risks to a few 
people is apparently more important than mitigating lower, more insigni- 
ficant risks affecting many more people. 
How justified are we in setting these sorts of differential safety prior- 
ities? Should public sentiment for the high-risk victim be permitted as  a 
part of the rational calculus of allocative decisions? O r ,  as Raiffa suggests 
in the following statement made at a recent congressional hearing, should 
the policy maker be more cognizant of the efficiency principles involved? 
We must not pay attention to those voices that  say one life is 
just as precious as 100 Lives, or that  no amount of money is as 
important as saving one life. Numbers do count. Such rhetoric 
leads to emotional, irrational inefficiencies and when life is a t  
stake we should be extremely careful lest we fail to save lives 
that could have easily been saved with the same resources ... (as 
quoted by Lowrance 1980, p.6). 
The problem can be generally phrased by asking how much the dis- 
tribution of the numbers should count, how far can we justifiably deviate 
from an efficient strategy of minimizing the years lost to human lives?6 
Can we trade off efficiency in allocating our lifesaving budget for a gain, 
however defined, in the equi ty  of the risk spread? Or by deviating from 
the most efficient solution, are we, as Raiffa once asked, murdering sta- 
tistical lives.. .?7 
I shall proceed by first examining the economist's perspective on the 
equity-efficiency problem witbn the context of the familiar Kaldor com- 
pensation rule for allocative decisions. The conclusion of this section, and 
the main point of my paper, is that this rule loses its appeal even to the 
most ardent supporters of market allocative mechanisms when applied to 
valuing the benefits of saving persons from high-risk situations. Some 
alternative ethical rules for resolving the equity-efficiency dilemma are 
presented in Section 111. The conclusion of this paper is that the analyst, 
though he or she cannot resolve the e tbcal  questions involved in allocat- 
ing safety expenditures among populations with differing risk spreads, 
can play a useful role by explicating the tradeoffs and moral issues impli- 
cit in these difficult allocative decisions. 
BThough I have generally stated the maximizing dilemma in terms of lives saved, Zeckhauser 
and Shepard (1076) have proposed that the objective function be expressed in terms of 
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) to account for differences in health status. The notion 
here is that cutting life expectancy for a group from, say, 80 years to 70 years, for ecrch 
member of the group is quite a different thing from an equivalent shift in the life tables 
Fought about by the deaths of healthy teenagers. 
This was expressed during personal communication. 
11. THE ECONOMIST'S PERSPECTIVE 
It is generally accepted among economists that the benefits of a pub- 
lic program are most appropriately measured in terms of the aggregate 
willingness to pay on the part of those benefiting from the program; simi- 
larly, the costs are most appropriately measured by the amount of money 
necessary to compensate the losers.' On the problem of determining how 
much a life-saving program is worth to a community, or alternatively, how 
much a community must be compensated for deaths that might be 
imposed by a government policy, the economist offers two pieces of 
advice: First, it is the individual's preference for his own life, not his 
economic worth to society, that is the paramount consideration. The 
"value of life" is, therefore, the value of a person's own life to himself, plus 
the value that his family, friends and society might add. But since this 
value is infinite in the sense that under most circumstances n o  amount of 
money can compensate a person for his certain death, the economist 
(notably, Mishan 1971b) offers a second piece of advice. The relevant con- 
cept is not life or death, but a (usually small) change in mortality risk, 
the value of which to most people is finite. I t  is not lives that are being 
valued, but rather the reduction or increase in the risk of death by some 
small amount over a large group of people. 
As will be shown in this section, a person's willingness to pay to 
decrease his risk of death increases with the seriousness of the risk. For 
'The most notable feature of this rule for allocating public funds is that it does not actually 
require the gainers to pay nor does it require that the losers be compensated. The rationale 
for adding up the costs and benefits in this manner is the familiar Kaldor compensation rule, 
requiring only an ability on the pert of the beneficiaries to compensate any losers so that 
everyone could be made better off. 
instance, a person will be willing to pay more to reduce h s  chances of 
dying from 0.9 to 0.8 than from 0.2 to 0 . 1 . ~  Following the logic of the 
willingness-to-pay rule to its logical conclusions, society will give priority 
to individuals exposed to h g h  risks at the cost of overall efficiency. By 
evaluating, not lives, but the risk of dying, the economist is inadvertently 
arguing against maximizuing lives saved. 
Ths  device of commuting the cost of death to the cost of risk of 
death has been recently attacked by Broome (1978), who claims its illegi- 
timacy lies in the fact that it capitalizes on the ex a n t e  ignorance of the 
public as to the number and identity of the deaths. 
Each project whch  causes deaths and which is nevertheless 
accepted is accepted in the knowledge that, were it re-evaluated 
later, it would be rejected as infinitely wrong .... it does not 
seem correct to distinguish in value between the death of a 
known person and of an unknown person. (p.94) 
By rejecting the practice of valuing projects e z  a n t e  to the fact of death, 
Broome appears to be arguing for an infinite cost on any program that 
imposes risks on the population, clearly an impractical way of conducting 
government's business. But this is not, in fact, the case Broome makes. 
He suggests that a Life, even one in immediate peril, has a finite value, 
which is no different from the value of a statistical life (barring any 
interests on the part of family, friends or society), and for his reason the 
policy maker is not justified in deviating from the efficiency principle in 
allocating funds for lifesaving. I shall be maklng the argument in the next 
section that  from a utilitarian perspective Broome's point, though 
''Though an individual is probably willing to pay more to reduce his chances of dying from 0.1 
to 0 than from 0.2 to 0.1 because of the reduction in his anxiety (Zeckhauser 1875). 
apparently misunderstood, is essentially correct. There is a finite value 
in terms of utility on a life which is not reflected in the willingness-to-pay 
measure described above 
Ths divergence of willingness to pay for a commodity from the utility 
gained by the purchase of the commodity is well documented in the 
economic literature dealing with consumer surplus. But the point raised 
by Broome, on which I hope to shed more light here, is that the use of 
money for the valuation of risks on life can be thoroughly misleading, far 
more serious than the usual nuances of the consumer-surplus measure. 
The reason for this is quite simply that money, as the evaluator, has a 
value not independent of what it is valuing, i.e., barring a legacy value, 
money is worthless to the dying man. In contrast to Broome, however, I 
shall not totally reject the practice of valuing deaths e z  ante to their 
occurrence, but shall show that this procedure is legitimate, even for the 
utilitarian, where the risks of death are small, but not legitimate, when 
the risks become large. Going beyond Broome, I shall argue that objec- 
tions to the differential treatment of risk, where in the extreme the iden- 
tifiable, immediate death is regarded as infinite and the statistical death 
as finite, are utilitarian in nature; the question of priorities for managing 
different risk spreads is an ethical question. But this is the subject of the 
next section. 
In this section, I shall proceed by presenting a simple model of indivi- 
dual choice regarding payments for personal risk reductions. According 
to this model, personal preferences for risk reductions depend on the 
level of the risk and not only on the size of the reduction.1° which justi- 
fies, in the Kaldor sense, deviations from a strict efficiency principle in 
'%s point has been made by Bergstrom (1874), Jones-Lee (1074), Howard (107D), as well ~a 
Linnerooth, e t  al. ( 1075). 
allocating public money for risk mitigation activities. My purpose in the 
remainder of this section is to show that t h s  model, though it has impor- 
tant descriptive appeal, may not be a desirable basis for prescriptive 
actions by public officials. For t h s  purpose, I will briefly review the wel- 
fare basis of the willingness-to-pay concept, and I will reevaluate t h s  wel- 
fare basis when the commodity under question is mortality risk. 
A. A SIMPLE MODEL 
Preferences with regard to risk of death can be viewed within the  
more general framework of decisions made under uncertainty, a frame- 
work which has long been dominated by the idea that  a person's choices 
under uncertainty are  made in such a way that  he maximizes his 
expected utility.'' Expected utility is usually formulated in terms of a 
probabilistic flow of goods or events affecting a person's well being. When 
the unfortunate event is death, we can conceptualize an  expected lifetime 
utility, denoted 0, which can be written: 
where pi is the probability of surviving exactly i years (i S n )  and p: is 
the utility of living in year i. The utility of living n  years can be thought of 
as lifetime utility, noted henceforth as uL, which should be distinguished 
l l~xpected  utility theory has been most extensively developed in the area of decision 
analysis (see Raiffa 1068) as a normative tool for the decision maker. In economics it has 
been adopted as a descriptive model of individual choice; its descriptive properties, however, 
have not gone without challenge. Recent works (Kahneman and Tversky 1074; Tversky 1075) 
show that there are certain attitudes which often lead to predictable violations of expected 
utility theory. 
from e z p e c t e d  l i f e t i m e  u t i l i t y ,  noted above as 0.  The gist of this formula- 
tion is simply that a person would be prepared in some sense to reduce 
his pleasures from life so that he might live a bit longer; or, alternatively, 
he would be willing to take on a risk to h s  life for some amount of com- 
pensation, monetary or other. There is a quality-quantity tradeoff. 
For reasons stated above, the policy maker is most concerned with 
the tradeoff a person would voluntarily make between money and uncer- 
tain life years, the money-quantity tradeoff. Since it has proved difficult, 
if not impossible, to obtain direct empirical evidence on t h s  tradeoff, 12 
there have been several attempts to deduce it from some higher-level 
hypothesis for which supporting evidence exists. A tempting way to 
proceed is to equate the pleasures of living with the pleasures of consum- 
ing. uL=U(C), for which some empirical evidence exists.13 But as I have 
pointed out elsewhere (Linnerooth 1979), implicit in this practice is the 
questionable assumption that a person views the loss of his livelihood as 
the loss of h s  life. 
I shall proceed on the assumption that we live for more than bread 
alone, with full realization that if deprived of our bread, we cannot live. 
Not attempting a complicated description of reality, I shall consider the 
case of the "lone bachelor," whose utility for each year of life is some 
combination of his consumption and nonconsumption activities, where 
the latter can be thought of as the pleasures from working, from watch- 
ing a sunset, or simply from being alive.14 To put this notion into an 
l Z ~ o r  a review of the values derived from compensating wage differentials, see Smith (1870). 
'%ee, for example, papers by Conley (1876) and Usher (1973). 
141t might be argued that all activities are consumption, or require a monetary outlay, e.g., 
watchmg a sunset demands a price in terms of the opportunity cost of the time spent. Yet, 
it is important to realize that these activities can be overlapping with respect to time. A 
state of mind, for instance, can be regarded as a separate neutral activity which demands no 
equation, let 
where ji is the joy of living independent of consumption and a, is the vec- 
tor of consumption goods in period i .  To simplify further, I will make 
three assumptions: 
(1) The person possessing the above utility function knows for cer- 
tain that  he will survive n years if he survives the first period, 
and his probability of surviving this first period is P. 
( 2 )  He receives an  equivalent amount of money or income ( m ) ,  in 
each of t h e n  years so that u(2) = p(m); and 
(3) His lifetime utility function is separable and additive in j and 
~ ( m ) .  
This permits m e  to  rewrite equation ( 2 )  as 
We can thus think of the lifetime utility of a person living n years as 
U L  = J + u ( M ) .  15 
Two features of this model are  worth emphasizing here:' 
y p e .  This is the sheer joy of being alive. 
Tbis lifetime utility function is not so dissimilar to the function proposed by Jones-Lee 
(lQ78), U(w , k ) = u (U ) + l (k ), where w  is the present value of the person's wealth, in- 
cluding discounted future labor income, and k is the time of the person's death. Separabili- 
ty implies that the person has access to actuarially fair life insurance and annuity markets 
from which he covers his entire human capital. 
-- Lifetime utility is finite, and 
-- lifetime utility is not synonomous with the utility of lifetime 
income. 
These propositions are illustrated in Figure 1, where, assuming diminish- 
ing marginal utility of money, the relationships among expected lifetime 
utility, survival probability and the utility of money are illustrated. I have 
arbitrarily set the utility of death at  zero, represented by the heavy line 
marked P = O .  If a person is at  point A, with probability of surviving Po (or 
expected lifetime P o n )  and with money income (or consumption) Mo, 
then the disutility of sudden death is not infinite, but KC, which is not 
synonomous with the disutility of losing one's lifetime income, or AD. 
The astute reader might, however, question that the person is indeed 
alive at  point E, where he has no money, or bread. If M is strictly inter- 
preted as personal consumption, it is correct to equate M=O with death, 
which would be illustrated by a discontinuity in the 8 function 
[ O  &=0) = 01. Yet, it seems highly unlikely that an individual would view 
the loss of his money literally as starvation. Of course, it can be argued 
that some among us might commit suicide if we were reduced to ban- 
kruptcy. Some might even commit suicide a t  some income greate? than 
zero.16 Clearly, the location of the curves in Figure 1 is an empirical 
matter, but I believe that, as they are shown, they capture the essence of 
the situation for most individuals. 
rs~irn Vaupel has pointed out to  me that a preference for death may not be equivalent to 
committing suicide because of the social stigmas attached, and that discussions with col- 
leagues have revealed that some would, indeed, prefer not being alive to  being alive with a 
low income. 
Figure 1: Lifetime Utility in Terms of 
Money Income and Survival Probability 
In sum, a reduction of income to zero is not necessarily viewed as a 
fate as bad as death; only where income is reduced to the point where the 
disutility of being alive but in debt is just offset by the joy of living, or 
U(M)=-J, is the individual indifferent between living and dying. And 
there may not be such a point, a case which will be argued in a later sec- 
tion. 
From equation (3) it is a simple matter to express the tradeoff this 
representative person, as an expected utility maximizer, would willingly 
make between income and survival probability. For constant levels of 
expected utility, the marginal rate of substitution for M and P is 
where A denotes the marginal utility of income for each respective 
period. 
This tradeoff is shown in Figure 2. The indifference curves represent 
a locus of points (P , M) such that expected utility remains constant. The 
slope of these curves, or the rate at  whch an individual is willing to trade 
a small amount of wealth for a small amount of safety, is often referred to 
as the "value of human life" appropriate for evaluating safety programs 
(see Bergstrom 1974, Jones-Lee 1974). 
Figure 2: An Indifference Function Showing the Tradeoff of 
Money for Survival Probability 
While the "lone bachelor" assumption has ruled out any motive on 
the part of the person to bequeath his wealth, inclusion of this motive 
would likely change the shape of the indifference curve, but the direction 
of the change is unclear.17 On the one hand, a person might be less 
171t is sometimes convenient to  separate wealth into two components, consumption and be- 
quests. However, it seems illogical to assume, as most writers on this subject, that bequests 
result in a posthumous utility. Bergdrom (in Hirschleifer, et a]., 1874), for example, speaks 
of a bequest as a consumption stream which continues posthumously to  those who are still 
alive. However, barring religious considerations, it is diiiicult t o  imagine a posthumous utili- 
ty on the part of the dead person. Indeed, this same argument could be applied to any ac- 
tivity which resulted in posthumous benefits to  others, e.g., spending time with one's chil- 
dren. It seems more reasonable to regard the bequest motive or providing for one's depen- 
dents m a separate lifetime activity, which can be included in consumption, resulting in util- 
ity (reduced anxiety about one's dependents) to the individual while he is alive. 
willing to pay out large sums of money for his own survival since this 
reduces h s  legacy to h s  survivors; on the other hand, a person might pay 
out even larger sums to ensure that he is alive to care, in an emotional 
sense, for h s  family. Moreover, it is important to recognize that I have 
not considered the additional willingness to pay for a person's survival on 
the part of his family, his friends, and the rest of society. However, to the 
extent that a person internalizes the grief or economic hardshp his death 
would cause others, these preferences would be double counted." In 
addition, Arthur (1980), on the basis of results derived from an 
economic-demographic model, suggests that a value of life should take 
into a account the reproductive value of the individual as well as the 
expected social costs of h s  support. Because of the added burden of 
social-security, extending an individual's life can be a social liability. 
Though the assumptions behind this derivation, most importantly the 
separable and additive utility function, the maximization of expected util- 
ity, and the case of the "lone bachelor", could be challenged, the most 
significant result, the nonlinearity of the indifference function, is prob- 
ably independent of these assumptions. This nonlinearity explains the 
phenomenon that most persons would not accept any amount of money 
for the certain loss of their life1' but commonly accept small risks on 
their lives for small amounts of compensation. 
i B ~  person's o m  feelings of self worth are founded to a large extent on his worth to his fami- 
ly, to  his friends, and to his profession, so i t  is logical that his preferences for protecting his 
own life internalize the preferences of those close to him. To the extent that this is the case, 
a simple addition of willingness t o  pay on the part of all concerned with a person's survival 
w uld, at least partially, double-count the contributions. 
181n fact, t h e n  is probably some risk less than certain death for which the ierson could not 
be compensated. This can be thought of as  the maximum-acceptable risk (see Jones-Lee 
10BOa). 
Now we have arrived at the heart of the matter. Because the tradeoff 
of money for survival chances is nonlinear, t h e  v a l u e  of l i f e  or t h e  p r io r i t y  
g i v e n  to  l i f e  s a v i n g  e z p e n d i t u r e s  w i l l  log ica l ly  d e p e n d ,  n o t  o n l y  o n  t h e  
s i z e  of t h e  r isk  r e d u c t i o n .  b u t  o n  t h e  leve l  of t h e  r i s k t Z O  One life saved for 
sure from certain death is different from ten reductions in mortality 
from .3  to .2, whch is in turn different from ten reductions in mortality 
from .2 to . l .  
If we accept the Kaldor rule for decisions on resource allocation, this 
model of personal choice would justify, in contradiction to the strategy of 
maximizing lives saved, the differential allocation of public funds among 
competing programs in accordance to differences in the spread of the 
risks. This principle which gives priority to the high per-capita group at  
risk, depending on the relative differences in the risk and the slope of the 
indifference functions shown in Figure 2, might lead the engineer respon- 
sible for the safety of the electric power plant emphasize worker safety, 
saving fewer lives than had he instead installed scrubbers on the stacks 
at  a near equivalent cost. 
In sum, the economist does not recommend an .efficient strategy 
where only expected lives lost or saved are of interest. As a case in point, 
Jones-Lee has recently argued for differential treatment of high-risk and 
low-risk populations exposed to radioactive material: 
%!his point was made by Weinstein, Shepard and Pliskin (1075) who showed that the notion 
of a unique value per expected life saved is  inconsistent with utility theory. The value varies 
depending on the level of the mortality probability being changed,~and not just on the kcre-  
ment . 
f i l e  it has been established that the expected number of 
adverse health effects (e.g., fatal cancers) from one man-sievert 
is effectively independent of the size of the irradiated popula- 
tion, the National Radiation Protection Board has nonetheless 
argued for an increasing (and indeed convex) relationshp 
between the cost of a man-sievert and the dose per capita (the 
latter being, of course, inversely proportional to the size of the 
irradiated population). The basis for this argument is namely 
that the cost (value) of the loss (saving) of one statistical life 
depends on the size of the population within whch the life is lost 
or saved because population size determines the magnitude of 
the risk to which each person is exposed and individual compen- 
sating variations are non-linearly related to risk. From a purely 
qualitative point of view, then, the N.R.P.B. position is gratify- 
ingly consistent with that for which I have argued (p.8) 
B. THE WELFARE BASIS OF THE KALDOR COMPENSATION TEST 
With the growing influence of economic logic in public policy analysis, 
it is crucial that the ethcal  basis of t h s  logic be carefully examined. 
What was essentially a descriptive model of consumer choice, where it was 
shown that the consumer will pay less to reduce a low-level risk than to 
reduce by an equivalent amount a hgh-level risk, becomes a prescriptive 
model of public choice only if one is prepared to accept that survival pro- 
bability can be treated as a commodity and that the Kaldor notion of 
social welfare, from which the willingness-to-pay (WTP) concept is derived, 
is a legitimate basis for public choice. 
i. Why Willingness- to -  Pay? 
Though the willingness-to-pay (WTP) concept has gained general 
acceptance by economists, and to an important extent also by public pol- 
icy analysts, its development in the literature is not without controversy. 
What is referred to here as WTP was originally labeled by Hicks (1939) as 
the compensating variation (CV), or that sum of money received by or 
from the individual whch, following a welfare change, leaves him at his 
original level of welfare. The CV is one of four measures of consumer 
surplus suggested by Hicks, of which one additional measure, the 
equivalent variation (EV), is of interest to this discussion. The EN is 
defined as that sum received by or from the individual whch, had he 
denied the change in question, leaves him as well off as if he had the wel- 
fare change. The essential difference between the two concepts is that 
the CV has reference to a person's original level of welfare, whereas the 
EV has reference to his subsequent level. These two concepts, as will be 
discussed shortly, take on importantly distinct meanings when applied to 
the valuation of programs that save or risk lives. 
The compensating variation is the concept closest to a willingness to  
pay measure. As mentioned above, the rationale for its use in making 
cost-benefit rankings rests on the acceptance of the Kaldor criterion, 
sometimes referred to  as the Pareto criterion, which asks if the gainer's 
gain enough to compensate fully the losers. 
If the costs and benefits of a decision consequence are measured in 
terms of the CV's, then the Kaldor or Pareto criterion may be stated as 
the excess of benefits over costs. Aside from the possibility of inequities 
in the distribution of the costs and benefitsee' if the interpretation of the 
Pareto criterion is that the gainers gain more than the losers lose, then it 
Z l ~ e  question of distribution is not the only unsettled matter in benefit-cost analysis. On 
the contrary, lively controversies remain over a number of other issues relevant to the 
evaluation of risk, including the problem of discounting future benefits and costs, quantiiy- 
ing these benefits in the absence of markets and expressing the relevant uncertainties. 
has a certain appeal in that it indicates a net gain in aggregate social well 
being. However, this interpretation does not always hold true. A positive 
sum of benefits over costs calculated in t h s  manner does not necessarily 
correspond to a positive net gain in aggregate utility or imply that the 
gainers have indeed gained more than the losers have lost. All that can 
be unambiguously stated is that a positive sum does suggest a welfare 
change within a Pareto context--which compares alternatives in terms of 
money rather than in terms of aggregate utility. 
The question of interest is how far off is t h s  measure, or under what 
conditions might the Pareto criterion correspond with a net aggregate 
utility change.22 This problem has been investigated primarily in the con- 
text of a change in the price of one or more commodities. Without going 
into the general conclusions of these investigations can be sum- 
marized as follows: 
(a) If there are no income effects, or if the marginal utility of 
money income is constant, the EV measures to a linear transfor- 
mation the change in a person's utility resulting from an 
economic change; 
(b) If the marginal utility of income is constant, the CV is equivalent 
to the EV. 
Clearly, the marginal utility of income (A) is the critical variable. Unfor- 
tunately, constancy of A means both constancy with respect to changes in 
%TO answer this question, it is necessary to revert from the Hicksien concept of ordinal util- 
ity, on which the criterion is based, to the Marshallian concept of cardinal utility to the ex- 
tent that diminishing marginal utility of income can be assumed and that interpersonal com- 
gyisons of utility can be made. 
The interested reader is referred to Currie, a t  d. (1871. 
the person's income and changes in the prices of all goods under con- 
sideration, and as Samuelson (1942) has shown, constancy of both is 
impossible. A constant h might, however, be approximated if changes in 
the price of the goods are small. Ths problem has led Mishan (1977) to 
conclude that 
... so long as the economist plods doggedly along the route 
pioneered by Marshall, seeking all the time to convert dollar 
measures of consumer surplus into utility measures, and vice 
versa, by reference to A, he is eventually impelled either to 
throw in the sponge or--what effectively comes to the same 
thmg-to invoke the constancy of A as a plausible assumption for 
negligible price changes that do not, in any case, matter and as 
a vain hope for large price changes that do matter (p.12). 
ii. The C o m p e n s a t i n g  V a r i a t i o n  f o r  N o n m a r g i n a l  C h a n g e s  in M o r t a l i t y  Risk 
The intent of the foregoing discussion was to introduce or review for 
the reader the somewhat weak welfare basis of cost-benefit calculations. 
It was shown that only under restrictive circumstances do the benefits 
and costs calculated by recourse to the WTP rule correspond exactly to 
changes in utility. Of course, policy analysis is not an exact science, and 
the cost-benefit practitioner might be justified in straying from the utili- 
tarian basis of cost-benefit judgments and (1) basing his policy judge- 
ments on the weaker Pareto criterion, or (2) assuming in certain cir- 
cumstances that by summing the CVs one gets a close approximation to 
the change in aggregate utility. I shall argue here that  only the former 
can serve to justify using WTP for valuing decreased mortality risk where 
serious threats to  life are concerned. 
Consider a small increase (Po - P I )  in a person's mortality risk, say 
from the construction of a n  electric power plant near h s  home, 
represented in Figure 3 by a move from A to  B. The amount of money 
required to compensate fully t h s  person for the increased risk to  his life, 
or the lump sum payment w hch  returns him to  h s  original level of 
expected lifetime utility (0,) is noted on Figure 3 as M C .  Ths  sum is the 
compensating variation. Mathematically, it can be written 
The question of interest to  us here is how closely this concept 
corresponds to  a person's welfare change, or to a change in his expected 
lifetime utility. In other words, how good is our concept of willingness-to- 
pay, or the CV, in measuring changes 'in utility due to changes in mortal- 
ity risk? 
To answer this question, I will proceed from the suppositions that  
expected lifetime utility depends upon beginning period survival proba- 
bility, the joy of living, and the joy of consuming, or  O = P [J+ u(M)], 
from w h c h  the tradeoff between money and survival probability was writ- 
t en  (see equation 4) as 
By substituting into equation (5), the CV for a change in P becomes 
0 P 
Figure 3: The EV and the CV for an Increase in Mortality Risk. 
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the CV(MC) and welfare 
change (A@) for a change in P(Po - PI ) .  Again consider a person at point 
A, with income M ,  and survival probability Po. If his chances of surviving 
are reduced to PI,  he moves from point A to point D. In order to be com- 
pensated for this move, he must be given the amount M l  - Mo, which 
restores h m  to his original expected utility at point B. In this case, 
From equation 6, it is seen that only if A and P are constant (thus 
allowing the terms [g and [d to be removed from the integral), does 
MC reflect a change in expected utility, or d o .  Clearly, it is impossible 
for P to remain constant over a change in P. It is the term [$I w i t h  
the integral that accounts for the nonlinear relation between Me and A@. 
And it is for this same reason that the curves in Figure 4 are not verti- 
cally parallel, whch would equate Me and A i d ,  allowing both to reflect 
changes in O to a linear transformation. Because the curves are not 
parallel, the relationship between AO and MC will depend on the initial 
level of P. Ths can be seen from Figure 4, where for an equivalent reduc- 
tion in mortality risk from P1 to P2, DE = AD, the compensating variation 
is shown to be greater (MC' > M C ) .  
Figure 4: The EV and CV for a Change in P Assuming Constant 
Marginal Utility of Income 
Broome (1978) has also noted this problem with relying on the CV to 
measure a change in utility. Choosing one particular path of change, 
P = PI, he suggests that the CV (or MC in Figures 3 and 4) be multiplied 
by the marginal utility of money averaged over values of money holdings 
between M1 and Mo, when the probability of survival is PI. Though not 
entirely clear from his discussion, Broome's mathematics reveal that he 
is interpreting the marginal utility of money, not as A, but as the margi- 
nal lifetime utility of money, d B /  dM = P A ,  which I will denote T. The fact 
that Broome measures the CV with P held at P,, is significant.24 This is 
the most usual interpretation of the compensating variation, and can be 
written 
so that A O ~ M C ( ~ , h ) = M C  T. The proportional sign can be interpreted 
here as equivalent up to a linear transformation. Thus, as Broome rightly 
states, "... if M! is to measure j's increase in utility, it must first be multi- 
plied (weighted) by an appropriate average of j 's  marginal utility of 
money (p.98)". 
I t  is not immediately intuitive from t h s  quote that Broome is not 
referring to the more usual interpretation of marginal utility of money A, 
but to T, where h is weighted by P. Accordingly, one must ask, what is the 
extra value of an additional dollar to an individual, which yields a value of 
A,  and then ask what is the probability of the person surviving to enjoy 
this extra dollar. The marginal lifetime utility of money, or T, is the pro- 
duct of the two. Though it is common knowledge that if WTP is to reflect a 
utility change, A  must be constant, it is not common knowledge that WTP 
for an increase in survival chances will reflect the utility gain only if T is 
constant. Clearly, T = P A  cannot remain constant over changes in P. 
'dpo measure this quantity with P fixed at  PI invokes an important assumption concerning 
the path of the change and the corresponding compensation. A person when asked for that 
amount he considers as adequate compensation for an increased risk of death will respond as 
though he is facing that risk. By definition, the Cv takes this particular path of adjustment. 
Alternatively, if one incrementally increased the probability of death and compensated a c  
cording to these ,small i n c l r e ~ n t s ,  in the limit this compensation would take the form (for 
constant A): M C  = -A- U [In Po - In PI]. This compensation, or the shadow price 
of mortality risk changes, will reflect ninequival;nt changes in utility depending on the path 
of the change. 
How can we interpret diminishing marginal lifetime utility of money? 
As a person's survival chances decrease, the value of h s  money decreases 
since he might not be around to enjoy it (recall that I have ruled out any 
bequest motive). So we are measuring the value of a commodity (survival 
probability) with a measure (money) the value of which is not indepen- 
dent of what it is measuring. In the economist's terminology, m o n e y  a n d  
s u r v i v a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  a r e  c o m p l e m e n t a r y  goods .  25 
As shown in Figure 5 ,  the seriousness of t h s  bias of money as the 
nurneraire increases as the probability of survival decreases. As P  
decreases, money becomes decreasingly valuable, reflected by the slope 
of O ( M ,  P ) ;  the ratio M C  / AO increases for equivalent changes in P .  In the 
extreme, when P  = 0, money has no value whatsoever to the individual, 
and M C  is infinite, noted on Figure 5 as the "money-is-worthless" trap. 
This explains why a person must be compensated an infinite amount to 
accept death, though his utility loss from dying as defined in this paper, 
is finite. 
Z 5 ~ a v k g  shown that the evaluation of mortality risk introduces a new complication into 
consumer-surplus calculations, it might be of interest to ask how the introduction of uncer- 
tain lifespan atiects the evaluation of more orthodox goods. Foy.this purpose, assume that 
n - -  
an individual allocates his budget over Xm goods where the Xm good is the numeraire, or 
money M .  Expected lifetime utility can therefore thus be ~ t t e n  
O = P U ( J ,  XI, . . . , Xm -1, M ) .  Proceeding as above (and assuming no cross partials), 
the Ck' for a change in 4 can be derived as 
which is surprisingly similar to the Ck' for a change in mortality risk as expressed in equa- 
tion (6). Again, if the Ck'is to reflect a change in utility, it must be adjusted for both dimin- 
ishing marginal utility of income (h) and for the person's probability of sunrival. Depending 
on the basis for making public policy, this result could have important implications for poli- 
cies affecting older populations. 
I 
I 
The Money-is- I 
1 M 
Figure 5: The E V  and the CV Illustrated. 
I t  might be argued at this point that the introduction of a bequest 
motive would have a devastating effect on the logic of this argument. 
Indeed, Jones-Lee (1978) leveled such an attack on a similar (but not 
entirely correct) logic pursued by Broome: 
... given that an individual is (a) able to make bequests and (b) 
concerned with the welfare of his surviving dependents, the mar- 
ginal utility of 'money' (i.e., wealth) will most certainly not be 
zero.... I t  is one thing to construct paradoxes for extreme cases 
in which purely selfish individuals without concern for depen- 
dents (or at  least without the means of expressing such concern 
through life insurance markets) are to die immediately (or dur- 
ing a forthcoming period) but quite another matter to achieve 
the same sense of moral outrage with examples drawn from the 
real world.. .. (p.255). 
While this critique by Jones-Lee is surely correct, I think its impor- 
tance to the arguments in the paper is only a matter of degree. Though 
the motive on the part of a person to leave a legacy to his survivors is in 
some cases undoubtedly strong, it is not clear i f  this bequest motive 
would dominate the motive on the part of a person to live, especially 
where a person views his responsibilities to h s  family more in terms of 
emotional support than financial support. Of course, the importance of a 
bequest motive to a person's safety decisions is an empirical matter,  and 
it would be expected that the bequest motive would be stronger in the 
decisions of elderly persons. 26 
iii. Roses for Rainy Day 
I t  should now be clear that money, in terms of compensation, cannot 
measure the utility losses from dangers imposed on human lives for two 
reasons: (1) the marginal utility of money cannot be assumed constant, 
and (2) the marginal lifetime utility of money decreases as one's chances 
for survival grow slimmer. To illustrate this point, Broome makes the fol- 
lowing analogy: 
... imagine trying to perform a compensation test with roses as 
medium instead of money. People cannot be compensated with 
roses for any major loss. Therefore, according to this method, 
rather a lot of projects would have an infinite cost. Nevertheless 
many of them could still be improvements (as we might be able 
to find out by recalculating their values in terms of money). The 
point is that roses are an inadequate measure for big costs and 
benefits. Money is a more powerful measuring instrument, but 
even the measuring rod of money is not long enough to encom- 
pass life and death. I hope this analogy will serve as a reminder 
that I have made no fancy claim that the value of life is infinite, 
but simply pointed out a difficulty in measuring it in monetary 
terms. Let us suppose that no finite number of roses could com- 
pensate a person for enduring a day of rain; no one would 
deduce that  a day's fine weather is infinitely valuable. 
"?'here is a good discussion of this point in JonesLee (1976). 
But compensation for a rainy day with roses is n o t  entirely analogous 
to compensation for a chance of death with money. It misses the point 
that money (or wealth) and survival probability are complementary 
goods. Whereas t h e  v a l u e  of m o n e y  d e p e n d s  o n  w h e t h e r  one l i v e s  t o  enjoy  
i t ,  t h e  v a l u e  of r o s e s  does  n o t  d e p e n d  o n  w h e t h e r  i t  is r a i n i n g .  This anal- 
ogy thus fails to show the complementary relationship between the com- 
modity and the measuring device. It appears from Broome's analogy that 
the difficulty lies only with diminishing marginal utility of roses, (and 
analogously only with A) which, the economist would counter, could be 
remedied if we allowed exchanges. But in the case of compensating for a 
possible death, barring indulgences, n o  pos s ib i l i t i e s  exist to exchange 
money for something of more use in the contemplated state of the (next) 
world. 27 
Attempting a revision of this analogy, to make it more analogous, 
imagine a rare rose that depends on sun for its very survival. The harder 
it rains, the shorter is its life. On a drizzly day, it may survive a few 
hours, but hardly long enough to be exchanged for another commodity. 
But when it pours, the rare rose survives only a few seconds. It might 
prove difficult, depending on a person's love of the rose, to compensate 
him for a drizzly day, but one can appreciate the added difficulty in com- 
pensating him for a cloud burst. 
',Tones-~ee, in his critique of Broome, recognizes the error Broome makes in ignoring the 
exchange value of roses. However, Jones-Lee fails to recognize that, though Broome's analo- 
gy is misleading, Broome's point that money cannot compensate the dying bachelor's utility 
loss is essentially correct. 
iv, The Equivalent Variation for Changes in M o ~ t a l i t y  Risk 
So far, a person's loss from a program decreasing h s  prospects for 
survival has been valued by the compensation which, coming after the 
change, would restore him to his initial wellbeing--called the compensat- 
ing variation. Recognizing the problems described above in using this 
concept as a measure of welfare, Broome has suggested that one might 
rely, instead, on the equivalent variation, or that amount of money which 
the person would be willing to pay to avoid the risk, shown in Figure 5 as 
yd. The key difference is that the latter reflects a person's perceived 
change in welfare coming e z  a n t e  to the change, itself. And, because it 
comes e z  a n t e  to the change, it circumvents the problem described above 
from the diminishing value of money. 
It can be recalled that the compensating variation, to reflect a 
change in utility, must be weighted by the e z  post  survival probability and 
the marginal utility of money, or A$ = PI A M C .  Noting where death is the 
outcome, it is problematic to multiply an infinite compensation by a zero 
probability, Broome suggests that the appropriate way around is to 
measure, instead, the equivalent variation, or Md: 
For a person whom the project proposes to kill, Md is (minus) 
the amount of money which, taken away from him, will leave 
him just the same welfare as if he were dead. The idea is con- 
ceptually staggering, but some people might claim to make 
sense of it, and they might suppose Md to be finite (p.99) 
Is Md finite? And, if so, does it provide a superior measure of welfare 
change to MC? I will show here that yd (for P=O) is finite only under cer- 
tain conditions, but does provide a closer measure of utility change than 
does M C .  To see this, we can begin by writing the E V  as 
which from equation (3) can be rewritten as 
If it could be assumed that A remains constant over the range of changes 
in 0, then M d  would express changes in expected lifetime utility unique to 
a linear transformation. The important variable here, as with any discus- 
sion of consumer surplus, is the marginal utility of money, or A. 28 
Turning to the question of whether M d  is finite when evaluating a 
person's certain death, the answer can be seen to depend on A .  Looking 
a t  Figure 6, the equivalent variation Md for a change in survival probabil- 
ity from Po to P1 is labeled M$ , and interpreted as that amount of money 
which can be taken away from t h s  particular person leaving him at  the 
same level of utility (el) as would a reduction in his survival probability 
from Po to PI. If he contemplates, instead, a reduction in his survival 
probability, not to PI, but to zero, the question becomes how much 
money would he be willing to give up to avoid this unpleasant fate. Is it 
%at is the relationship between the E V  and the CV? Looking at Figure 3, the two would 
be equivalent if the indifference curves were vertically parallel, requiring a constant margi- 
nal rate of substitution between P and M ,  or 
It is common knowledge among consumer-surplus specialists that a constant marginal utility 
of money will ensure this condition. However, one must be careful here. It is not appropri- 
ate here to  interpret this condition to mean constant h; rather, it must be interpreted es 
constancy of the marginal l ~ ~ ~ t i m s  utility of money, or T, since 
this condition cannot hold over changes in P. Thus, in this case, a constant h is not suffi- 
cient for equivalency of the CV and the EV. 
finite? 
Figure 6: The Behavior of Md as P Approaches Zero. 
The answer depends on whether a financial state, or a level of debt, is 
reached where the individual is indifferent between life and death. At this 
point, and only a t  this point, does the indifference map shown in Figure 6 
intersect the M-axis, a necessary condition for a finite Md. From my 
model, where O=P[J+U(M)], this point is interpreted as U(M)=-J, at  
which point @=On But this condition may never be reached. There are two 
possible interpretations of U(M). A person may perceive a level of debt a t  
which his life would no longer be worth living or alternatively, a person 
may perceive life t o  be worth living no matter  how bad the circumstances 
(h>O for M <O). In Figure 5, this is labeled as the "Nothug-As-Bad-As- 
Death" trap,  since if A goes to zero, there will be no finite value for Md. 
C. SOME REFLECTIONS 
Consumer sovereignty prescribes that society recognize the right of 
the individual to spend h s  fortune as he chooses in the expectation of his 
soon approachng death, even though the social opportunity cost of his 
doing so might be high. A person with terminal cancer may choose to 
spend a large sum on a cure with little chance of success. Though the 
dollar is of little value to  the person who does not expect to  be around to  
enjoy it, in society's view it is a dollar that is not spent on the school sys- 
tem, on providing housing for the poor, or o n  prov id ing  grea te r  chances  of 
keep ing  someone a l i ve  e k e w h e r e .  
Where the private value of a dollar seriously understates the social 
value, is society justified in valuing public programs in reference t o  the 
former? In the author's opinion, the  WTP rule loses its appeal in this case 
since the judgment of the people concerned is based, in part,  on their 
slim chances of survival.2g However, there may be other attractive rea- 
sons for coming t o  the rescue of persons in serious peril, which will be 
taken up in the next section. 
Before proceeding, however, it must be emphasized that  the equity 
issue discussed here is qualitatively different when lifetaking, as opposed 
to lifesaving, is of concern. Appealing to  the Pareto criterion when a 
redistribution of utility f r o m  the dying man to  society is involved is 
morally different from appealing t o  the rule where the redistribution is 
f r o m  society t o  the individual in peril. Rescuing a person from certain or 
"~ccordin~ to Gould and Thaler (lQBO), the willingness to pay by a group with a low survival 
probability might be ignored (or rather, discounted) for this reason. 
near certain death invokes an ethical judgment distinct from that of con- 
demning a person to certain or near-certain death.30 As Blumstein (1976) 
has noted, t h s  dichotomy is apparent in the reluctance of the Supreme 
Court to condone capital punishment--whch has imposed a duty of indivi- 
dualized decision-making in capital cases. Yet, the Court has interpreted 
the constitution as not guaranteeing government support to a hemoph- 
liac who faces the finality of death without this support. "Of course, there 
is a fantastic overlay of symbolic issues in the death penalty controversy, 
creating significant external costs to our self-image as a humanitarian 
society, committed to preservation--not destruction--of human life." 
(Blumstein 1976, p.266). As with any redistributive question where pro- 
perty rights are involved, taking away a person's chances of survival is a 
separate matter from increasing these chances. 
111. THE UTILITARIAN AND RAWlSIAN PER3PECTlVES 
The intent of the last section was to dissuade the reader from 
accepting uncritically the Pareto principle where the saving of the high- 
risk person is concerneda3' This principle is based upon the notion that 
personal life extension is a commodity and should be valued in terms of 
what the person, including his family and friends, is willing to pay for it. 
It has been shown that this principle would, at least under some assump- 
%e give a firing aqmd one blank cartridge so that every member can pretend that he did 
gpt take a life. 
Of course, the question of an ethicel stance can be viewed as a question of the appropriate 
societal objective function. Going somewhat beyond the ethical discussion here, Lourance 
(1880) presents a number of possible objectives that society might adopt when choosing 
which risks to reduce. 
tions, afford priority to the high-risk case. 
A second argument for maximizing lives saved is based upon the con- 
cept of a collective or social preference for spreading risks, or for helping 
those in particular danger. Keeney (1978) proposed a criterion of r isk  
equity as being one desirable aspect of the public's value structure for 
evaluating risks. According to Keeney, if individuals are at risk due to a 
common activity or situation, it seems intuitively fairer if the risks are in 
some sense balanced among all the individuals concerned. Recalling the 
example of the electric power plant, Keeney's intuition would favor reduc- 
ing the higher risks to the group of workers over reducing the pollution 
risks affecting a larger group.32 This recommendation is not based on a 
willingness to pay notion on the part of those concerned, but rather on a 
desire on the part of society to spread the risk burden. 
In this section, I will examine this question of social preference from 
the point of view of the Utilitarian and the Rawlsian. I have chosen these 
two alternative ethical perspectives because they offer intriguing con- 
trasts and similarities to the Pareto principle. Without being comprehen- 
sive, the aim of this section is simply to give the reader the. flavor of two 
alternative ethical perspectives. 33 
32~ust as placing priority on the hqh-risk case does not maximize lives saved, Keeney 
demonstrates that adherence to his concept of equity implies acceptance of a risk-prone 
~hility function over number of fatalities, also not maximizing lives saved. 
In addition, one might consider, the elitist system of Nietzche, the more class conscious 
Marxian View, or the more egalitarian perspective of Kant. 
A. THE UTILITARIAN VIEW 
The utilitarian ethical view, as expressed by Bentham (1978), John 
Mill (1863), and others, requires "the greatest good for the greatest 
number." This ethical system can be translated into a utility concept, 
where the social objective is to maximize the sum of the cardinal utilities. 
The measurement problems involved in assessing interpersonal differ- 
ences in utility are well documented and preclude strictly pragmatic 
applications of the ethic. 
Yet some insights can be gained by applying the principle of aggre- 
gate utility maximization on the assumption that cardinal utilities can be 
approximated. T h s  procedure has a special appeal when applied to the 
problem of safety allocation, where the policy outcome can be expressed 
in terms of life and death. A simple and appealing way to proceed is to  
suppose that  each person in society, regardless of who he or she is, 
enjoys the pleasures of life to  the same extent as any other person in the 
society. Recalling the utility function described in the last section, 
CLZL = q(ji + l(i(w)), where the lifetime utility of individual i is a sum of 
his joy of living (ji) and his joy of consuming (pi(-)) summed over his n 
years of life, this assumption would assign equivalent j ' s  and p ' s  to  each 
person. Thus, lifetime utilities differ only to the extent of varying money 
holdings and lifespans. If we assume further that  each person is endowed 
with the  same level of yearly income, and if ji and &(mi) are indepen- 
dent of the year in which they occur, then the utilitarian view translates 
into the strategy: maximize total life years. This is one version of the  
efficiency strategy, whlch in contrast to Keeney's risk-equity concept, 
requires the decision maker to proceed on the basis of a risk-neutral 
social utility function over the number of life years lost. If this is not the 
case, it should be recognized that the utilitarian would give preference to 
the lives of the wealthier people if they are, as this utility function sug- 
gests, in some sense "happier." 
From the model in this paper, it can be easily shown (see Appendix) 
that the utilitarian value of life is a simple extrapolation from a person's 
willingness to pay for a reduction in h s  mortality risk a t  that point where 
the person considers his chances of surviving the period without the risk 
to be close to one, or 
d o = j h + d p  for P m l .  
This equation has empirical significance, since if we can approximate a 
value for h (marginal utility of money), we can assign a money value to 
risk changes over the entire range, 0 9  P  s 1 ,  from the slope of the 
indifference function a t  P  M 1 .  Seen in this light, i t  becomes clear that 
Broome's rejection of the use of the WTP measure for valuing changes in 
survival chances, where he accepts the utilitarian life value implied by 
use of the equivalent variation, is contradictory (see Appendix). 
The most striking implication of the utilitarian approach, narrowly 
interpreted, is that no special regard is attributed the distribution of 
risks in society; the relevant policy-variable is the number of people (or 
people years) who are in danger or who will be endangeredeM The low-risk 
3 4 ~  perhaps disturbing implication of this approach is the symmetry of the Life lost and the 
life saved. A strict interpretation of the utilitarian view suggests that, if the case arises, one 
person should be "sacriticed" for the rescue of two persons. 
population breathing the polluted air from the power plant would receive 
priority, in view of the greater number of expected deaths, over the 
higher risk group of workers who will be exposed to occupational risks. 
Ths conclusion is, of course, derived from the model presented here 
and deserves qualification. The distribution of the risks may be relevant 
to the utilitarian once interdependent utilities are introduced into the 
model. If Mr. X does care if a person or a group of people is facing a seri- 
ous risk, then he has a positive utility gain if measures are taken to miti- 
gate t h s  risk. This interdependency utility may be founded on two dis- 
tinctly different premises: First, Mr. X may stand in special relation to 
this person (or group) due to present or potential love, friendship, or 
financial considerations. Second, his positive feelings toward taking extra 
measures to help those in a life-threatening situation may be based upon 
more abstract concepts of justice and fairness as suggested, for example, 
by Keeney's social utility function discussed earlier. 
However, this second rationale for doing more to aid those facing 
higher risks must be ruled out for the utilitarian since, by definition, it 
deviates from his concept of social utility. The first argument or what 
Fried has called the personalist argument deserves, however, some men- 
tion. The personalist argument, according to Fried, holds that some 
preference for known over statistical lives is justified since it is with iden- 
tifiable people that we enter into relations of love and friendship, while to 
the abstract statistical lives we stand in relations defined by justice and 
fairness. On the question of turning away the person in immediate peril, 
the personalist would have this to say: 
We will refuse to recognize an individuality that is there for us to 
recognize, and we will do it moreover in a context where that 
other person's life might be at stake. It is t h s  that seems a hor- 
rible thing to do, horrible to contemplate and horrible to experi- 
ence ... in many of our dealings--as taxpayers, as voters, as pub- 
lic servants, as entrepreneurs-we can look at  our fellow men 
only as abstractions, as statistical persons. But often too we 
encounter people as actual persons, and there it seems we have 
the occasion, the opportunity to show our deeper humanity. 
(Fried, p. 1430). 
Though this argument has great intuitive appeal, Fried recognizes that 
there are objections which may leave little of it standing. The categoriza- 
tion of immediate and present peril may not encompass all those situa- 
tions where one stands in a special, emotional relation to the victims. 
Yet, a more serious objection concerns the distinction between persons 
known a t  the time of the decision and those statistical lives who will be 
known at  a later time. On the question, for example of using a limited 
supply of serum for vaccinating (preventive) or for curing those with a 
fatal disease, those later victims will be as clearly identified as those 
present patients, and we will stand in exactly the same relation to the 
later victims as we stand to those current ones. Whether one accepts or 
rejects the personalist argument as relevant to the utilitarian, the impor- 
tant point is that from the utilitarian's perspective, in contrast to the wel- 
fare economist's, the differential treatment of risk populations cannot be 
justified by reference to an individual's own preferences for reducing 
high risks to himself, but can only be justified by reference to a desire on 
the part of others to respond disproportionately toward the more 
threatening situation. 
One rather appealing principle that supports the utilitarian ethic has 
been put forth by Harsanyi (1977), and perhaps deserves mention. 
According to Harsanyi the ethic used for distributing resources should be 
impartial in the sense of reflecting the preferences of a person who is 
impartially situated, or a person who does not know h s  position in the 
decision a t  hand. Referring to the power plant example, the impartially 
situated person has a hgher  chance of being killed from the pollution 
(since he has a higher probability of being in t h s  large group where 
expected deaths are hgher) than from the occupational risk. Thus, for 
selfish reasons he should adopt the utilitarian stance 
A decision-theoretic approach to valuing a year of life formulated by 
Weinstein, et al. (1975) adopts this Harsanyian view. The authors suggest 
that the relevant time to value a program, such as a dialysis center, is 
before the victims become victims, that is, ez ante to the fact of identifi- 
able persons in need. 
... the situation would be quite different if we asked each indivi- 
dual i n  advance (to his illness) to decide whether it was worth it 
to him to have dialysis available. Since this is the relevant ques- 
tion, it is on this basis that decisions between dialysis and other 
forms of care should be made. (p.19). 
B. RAWL'S THEORY OF JUSTICE 
According to Rawl's (1971) ideal contractuahsm, principles of justice 
are seen as agreements that would be made by rational deliberates seek- 
ing to pursue their interests behind a "veil of ignorance," or without 
knowledge of their place in society (natural abilities, class, and so on). He 
maintains that persons in the initial situation would choose two principles 
to guide social decisions: "the first requires equality in the assignment of 
basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic 
inequalities, for example, inequality of wealth and authority, are just only 
if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for 
the least advantaged members of society" (pp. 14, 15). 
From t h s  second principle, Rawls derives h s  criterion of social jus- 
tice, the so-called "difference principle,", suggesting that basic institu- 
tions ought to maximize the life prospects of the worst-off person in 
society, sometimes called a "maximin" strategy. Inequalities are 
tolerated only if they serve the purpose of increasing the size of the pie to 
everyone's advantage. 
Rawls' theory, which he refers to as justice as fairness, is an alterna- 
tive to the classical utilitarian thought discussed above. A principle which 
may require lesser life prospects for some simply for the sake of a 
greater sum of advantages for others, Rawls argues, would not arise from 
the original agreement. A rational man would not accept a basic struc- 
ture merely because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages in the 
society (Rawls, p.14). The question between utilitarianism and justice as 
fairness comes down then to the question whether the disadvantages 
imposed on a few can be outweighed by a greater sum of advantages 
enjoyed by others; or whether, as Rawls argues, moral justice permits 
only those economic and social inequalities whch are in each and every 
person's interests. 
With this necessarily rough description of Rawls' theory of justice, let 
me turn to  the problem involving the unequal distribution of risks from 
the construction of the electric power plant.35 Assuming the plant has 
3 h w l s '  first principle of justice, which must be fulfilled before equity of the costs and bene- 
been built, should the risks to  the workers or the risks to the general 
population be mitigated when b o t h  cannot be mitigated? Assuming that 
the population cannot be fully compensated for the risks already imposed 
on them, the choice of whch risk-mitigation measure to adopt is a ques- 
tion of how society can best advance toward the social ideal. Assume for 
the sake of argument that the two populations suffering from unequal 
risks of air pollution and occupational hazard are equal in every other 
respect. Applying Rawls' maximin rule to this decision would suggest that 
priority be given to improving the circumstances of the most disadvan- 
taged, or the workers. Rawls concedes that a maximin procedure is not 
always the most rational one for choices under uncertainty, but it would 
be chosen, he maintains, when certain conditions exist: when knowledge 
of the probabilities of various outcomes is limited, when the prospects of 
gain are not terribly enticing, and when the possibility of losing is intoler- 
able (pp. 153-155). 
Thus in the Rawlsian perspective, not unlike Keeney's, how the risks 
are distributed is of critical importance. But does it make a difference if 
the risks are distributed across populations as in the above example, or, 
alternatively, if they are distributed over time? Returning to the topical 
problem of prevention versus treatment as two routes for increasing 
lifespan, I would interpret the Rawlsian difference principle as giving 
priority to  those most acutely in need. It would favor e z  post medical res- 
cue over e z  a n t e  preventive measures. However, this interpretation is 
debatable since the original contractors would, as the Harsanyian view 
fits are considered, requires that everyone involved have equal opportunity w i t h  respect to 
the social institution charged with making this decision. In addition, there must be ap- 
propriate safeguards for assuring this equality during the course of the decision. 
suggests, see themselves as having a low probability of needing acute 
medical aid but a b g h  probability of benefiting from preventive meas- 
ures. 
As a final thought on t b s  subject, we can ask if the contract parties 
might choose to give safety lexical priority, or regard life as a right with 
unqualified priority over other wants, as a social primary good on a par 
with civil l i b e r t i e ~ . ~ ~  Just as Green (1976) argues that  access to health 
care is a citizens right, could we not reason that  every member of society 
has a right to life. Are not such guarantees already present in the U.S 
constitution, for example, as stated in section one of the  fourteenth 
amendment: "No state ... shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law ..." 
The only answer to the question of giving lexical priority to life is that  
it simply is not possible. As Arrow (1963) points out, a strict maximin 
solution to the problem of health services could lead to  the choice of 
medical procedures so costly as to reduce society to a level of sub- 
sistence. At any rate, according to Blumstein ( 1976) the court would be 
unlikely to  expand the government's responsibility to include the mainte- 
nance and sustenance of life: 
Such expansive readings of the concepts of "life" and "depriva- 
tion" under the fourteenth amendment would transform the 
nature of government's role in the  life-saving area,  thrusting on 
the state the "role of a giver of life itself." The Court appears 
unwilling to  read into the Constitution such positivistic notions, 
and that  analytical approach would be out of step with recent 
%1t is not, however, the case that Rawls gives civil liberties u n q u a l ~ d  priority over other 
wants. For this reason, enjoyment of equal health opportunities or an equally safe environ- 
ment could be argued to rank with "liberty" among the social priorities established by the 
theory of justice. 
decisions. (p.247). 
Notwithstanding its impracticality, there appears to be an important 
myth that life is "priceless." This is the argument considered by Schelling 
(196B), Zeckhauser (1976), and most recently Calabresi and Bolbit (1978), 
that in giving preference to the identifiable person in immediate peril 
society can maintain this myth. Ths  is often referred to as the symbolic 
value argument, and is summed up in the following quote from Zeck- 
hauser (1975): 
When risks of lives are involved, an important valued belief is 
that society will not give up a life to save dollars, even a great 
many dollars. Rarely is t h s  belief, widely held albeit mistaken, 
put on a clear test. When it is, it may be desirable for society to 
spend an inordinate amount on each of. a few lives to preserve a 
comforting myth (pp. 447-446). 
Fried, who generally argues for the maximizing lives saved, calls this 
argument "either confused, wrong, or morally repugnant" (p. 1425). Since 
the funds for preserving this myth must come from somewhere, and pos- 
sibly from another life-saving activity, the myth has a cost in terms of 
human life. "But surely it is odd, to say the least, to  symbolize our con- 
cern for human life by actually doing less than we might to save life" 
(p.1425). 
IV. CONCLUDING FtEXARIYS 
Whether to deviate from a strict policy of allocating public funds to 
save as many lives or life years as possible where the alternative is to 
favor those persons facing h g h  risks, is a difficult moral judgment. I have 
argued in this paper that the efficiency-equity tradeoff implied by this 
choice should not be resolved by recourse to the economist's model of 
consumer choice without a critical examination of the underlying ethcal  
principles. Where the decision involves persons facing high risks to their 
lives the Kaldor principle, on which the economist's calculations of the 
value of "rescue" might be based, may seriously overstate the utility gain 
of this rescue. Placing priority on the hgh-risk population by virtue of 
the Kaldor principle cannot be rationalized by arguments of a net utility 
gain among those receiving the life-saving benefits and those paying the 
costs. Accepting the c onsurner-choice model for resolution of the equity- 
efficiency issue, therefore, rests upon little more than dogmatic adher- 
ence to the Kaldor principle. 3 7 
Where life and death are possible consequences of a government's 
actions, the numbers d o  count. Providing the policy maker with informa- 
tion concerning the number csf lives involved or the number of life years 
endangered by a contemplated action is undoubtedly worthwhile. In 
evaluating these consequences, in the opinion of the author, both effi- 
ciency and equity are relevant policy goals, and an approxirnation of wil- 
S 7 ~ t  might be objected here that the Kaldor principle is not intended to  resolve questions of 
equity. But this notion of equity involves distributional disparities between those paying the 
costs and those receiving the benefits and not, as is the issue here, among several alterna- 
tive program receiving funding. For the latter, the Kaldor principle is claimed to have 
relevance. 
lingness to pay (or necessary compensation) on the part of the population 
a t  risk is useful data. 38 
However, in t h s  paper I have rejected the notion of individual prefer- 
ence for personal risk reduction as the final word on t h s  issue, at  least 
where Lifesaving is the topic of concern. I have examined two alternative 
ethical systems. The utilitarian, if the utility of a year of life is assumed 
to be the same for everybody, would recommend maximizing lives or life 
years saved, where no distinction is made between the saving and the tak- 
ing of a human life. A Rawlsian, on the other hand, would come to the aid 
of those in the most need placing high priority on the equality of the risk 
spread, 
If, in the case of lifesaving, we count the costs incurred by deviating 
from the utilitarian's maximizing strategy in terms of lives lost, and give 
these lives names and faces, this strategy of minimizing human death 
appears to  be the only humanitarian principle on which to base public 
choices. The nonutilitarian, the argument might go, must recognize that  
he is a murderer of statistical lives. But are we framing the issue 
appropriately? Who among us could justify, for instance, purchasing a 
television set  with the knowledge that somewhere a life could be saved 
with this money? Could we not use "lives" as a numeraire for calculating 
"still, the cmalyst must be cautious lest he misuse this information. I have argued else- 
where (Linnerooth 1078) that risk is a multidimensional concept including situational factors 
(who cmd how are the people affected?) and psychological factors (how do those affected p e r  
ceive the seriousness of the risk (Otway and von Winterfeldt 1900; Slovic, of d. 1070). In 
some cases it  is not legitimate to consider the risk as a social or economic fact capable of 
being analyzed outside the context in which the risk is revealed and expressed. For example, 
i t  has been suggested (Otway and von Winterfeldt 1080) that risk of nuclear power has been 
used as  an outlet to express an individual's dissatisfaction with hightechnology society. A 
procedure whereby the analyst evaluates the risk by multiplying the probability of death by 
a life value determined from some other hazardom activity would clearly not catch the 
essence of the situation. 
the costs of every aspect of our economic existence? Is the fact that the 
rescue of individuals facing high risks might be funded from a hypotheti- 
cal lifesaving budget a compelling reason for singling out this expenditure 
for such scrutiny? As a case in point, Justice Stewart, who was concerned 
about the effects of a decision that allowed publication of a report reveal- 
ing critical military secrets, asked what would be the consequences if 
publication meant the judicial sentencing to death of a hundred people. 
On this question, Calabresi commented that there are harms that depend 
on the process used to decide terribly important issues of life and death. 
He concluded that institutions must avoid allowing an issue to be framed 
in such a way. 3 9 
Alternatively, the economist would certainly argue that no matter 
how diverse the values of a society nothng can be lost by making the 
tradeoffs open and visible, and the gains will be evident by limiting abuse 
of discretion. If, indeed, the opportunity cost of purchasing a television 
could be calculated in terms of the lives lost from neglecting hghway 
safety, would this not help us reorder our priorities? Surely, we can 
accept that a t  some point watching our favorite television program is 
worth the costs in terms of our national health. 
And, after recognizing this inevitable tradeoff between our lifestyle 
and the lifespan of our members, could we not recognize further that a 
similar tradeoff exists between spreading the human costs from this lifes- 
tyle and the additional lives this equality costs. Contrary to the 
utilitarian's efficiency strategy, an  egalitarian distribution of the risks to 
39~his discussion is taken from Blumstein (1976). 
Life and limb does, from my point of view, have social value. Of course, 
this equality has a cost in terms of human life, as does every human 
activity, and t h s  cost should be made explicit so that our elected 
representatives can make clear and open choices. 40 
By recognizing the value of favoring the high-risk case, it seems that 
I arrive a t  identical conclusions as implied by the economist's model of 
individual choice. The difference is that I base this policy recommenda- 
tion on a social concern for the distribution of the risks of industrialized 
society, rather than on individual "votes" for safety in the marketplace. 
This distinction, important from a philosophical point of view, may have 
significant empirical implications as well. 
''~alabresi argues against explicit criteria for making society's tragic choices, or deciding 
who shall live and who shall die. There is no right answer to these decisions, Calabresi rea- 
sons, because there are no consistent, fundamental values in a pluralistic, democratic na- 
tion. Thus, in tragic-choice situations, "a-responsible" agencies may serve a useful function 
by blurring the hierarchy of values used to decide. While Calabresi's argument has strong 
merits for the difficult choice of assigning a life-saving device to either Mr. Jones or Mrs. 
Smith, its merits for deciding the issue of priorities on differential risk situations where 
there are no ez ante identifiable victims, is not so evident. 
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APPENDIX 
THE UTILITARIAN VALUE OF LIFE 
A REEXAMINATION OF THE CASE MADE BY BROOME (1978) 
While the strategy of maximizing lives saved requires a fixed 
value on a life or on a life year, it does not tell us what this value 
should be in order to reflect the priority given life extension relative 
to other social needs. For t h s  purpose, a measure of aggregate util- 
ity change accruing from all projects under consideration is needed. 
Since it is especially convenient to express utilities in money, the 
question can be phrased, is there a money measure that 
corresponds directly to the utility change from an increased or a 
decreased risk of dying? 
It can be recalled from Section II1.B. that a person's willingness 
to pay for his own safety, or the compensating variation, does n o t  
reflect h s  changed utility position from the safety expenditure 
without appropriate adjustments for his survival probability and for 
his marginal utility of money. In what follows here, I shall propose a 
simple devise for making these adjustments in order that one might 
arrive at  the utilitarian value on a human life. 
From the model outlined in Section I l l ,  where O = P U ~ ,  and 
dO = uL d P ,  a change in lifetime utility is a linear function of the 
change in the probability of surviving. From t h s  result, we need only 
obtain one money measure of a change in P .  This money equivalent 
can then be extrapolated linearly for the value of changes in mortal- 
ity over the entire range, including certain death. 
To calculate the money measure for d B/ d P ,  we can begin with a 
willingness-to-pay measure. From equation (4), willingness to pay for 
a marginal change in mortality is expressed 
A way around the complication of a decreasing value of money is to 
calculate this tradeoff between risk and money at that point where 
the person considers his chances of suruiuing without the risk to be 
cLose to one, so that 
This equation has empirical significance, since if we can approximate 
a value for A (marginal utility of money), we can assign a money 
value to risk changes over the entire range, 0 < P% 1, from the slope 
of the indifference function at  P 1. 
To illustrate, consider a person who views his chance of surviving 
the period as almost certain and who is willing to take on a .001 
chance on his life for $300. Assuming his marginal utility of money is 
around 0.8, then from equation (13) we can calculate the dollar 
equivalent of changes in h s  lifetime utility as d O = $240,000 d P ,  
which can be interpreted to mean that the dollar equivalent of cer- 
tain death is $240,000. From the utilitarian's standpoint, the value of 
t h s  individual life is 3240,000. In sum, with information on the 
requisite compensation for a small risk given P " 1, and with an 
assumption on the marginal utility of money, it is possible to esti- 
mate (to a linear transformation) changes in personal utility result- 
ing from increased or decreased survival probability over the entire 
range of probabilities (0 r .P 51). 
It can be recalled from Section I1 that there are two different, 
but conceptually similar methods for arriving at  life time utility 
changes resulting from risks to life. One is based on a person's 
evaluation of a small probability of death (the compensating varia- 
tion) when h s  survival chances are good; the other is based on the 
equivalent variation weighted by the marginal lifetime utility of 
money as shown above. In both cases, the disvalue of death is finite. 
From t h s  discussion, it becomes clear that Broome (1978) is 
only partially correct in his claim to have demonstrated the following 
two things: 
Firstly, if an attempt is made to fix a monetary value on 
life, it is quite wrong to do it on the basis of people's evalua- 
tions of probabilities of death. Secondly, because the 
monetary compensation required for loss of life is infinite, 
cost-benefit analysis will be inapplicable for judging any 
proposal involving deaths. There is one exception to this 
last point. A finite monetary valuation for life could in 
theory be obtained by taking the equivalent variation, as 
opposed to the compensating variation, and weighting it by 
a suitable marginal utility (p. 100). 
Broome's two results are contradictory. His advocacy (qualified 
since he rejects the utilitarian logic) of a weighted form of the 
equivalent variation--to reflect utility change--is, as shown above, 
quite the same as advocating the use of personal assessments of the 
probability of dying and adjusting for A ,  where P is close to unity. 
The latter concept he rejects wholeheartedly as exploiting the ex 
a n t e  ignorance as to who will die on the part of those making the 
valuation. But it is just t h s  ez  a n t e  ignorance that allows a relatively 
unbiased .valuation of the utility loss from dying, since, as Broome 
himself points out, if one knows he will die, his money loses all value. 
So it appears that Broome rejects the utilitarian value of risk 
changes when he rejects the ez an te  measure, but embraces the util- 
itarian value when he suggests, as an alternative, the equivalent vari- 
ation as the appropriate measure. As I have shown here, the 
equivalent variation is not an alternative, but simply a different way 
of expressing the value of small changes in P in the range of P FY 1. 
Because of the significance attributed to Broome's arguments, 
these points deserve some more elaboration. Consider Broome's 
summary of his main points: 
A way of summarizing what I have argued is this. A valua- 
tion of a project may be made before it is carried out and 
before the distribution of its costs and benefits is exactly 
known, on the basis of people's choices about the risks 
involved. Call this an "ez  ante" valuation. An "ez  post" 
valuation, on the other hand is one made at  the time of the 
implementation of the project, when the details of all its 
effects are settled. The two will often be different. My 
claim is that, of the two, the ez post valuation is the correct 
one (in so far as any cost-benefit analysis is correct) 
because it is the valuation of the actual project, whereas 
the other is really a valuation of the expectations created 
by the project. The ex a n t e  valuation is useful only to the 
extent that it approximates to the e x  pos t  valuation. But, 
in the particular case of a project causing deaths, it is no 
sort of approximation at  all, since the former has finite 
costs and the later infinite ones. The ex a n t e  valuation, in 
the case of death, is worthless, and furthermore it can be 
shown to be worthless a t  the time it is made. 
From t h s  summary, it appears that 
(1) Broome rejects the e z  a n t e  valuation of mortality risk, 
which seems to suggest an infinite value on a death. 
Yet, as noted above, Broome shows that a way out of the infinite- 
value-on-a death dilemma is to adopt a utilitarian approach. Hence 
(2) Broome advocates a finite value on a life based on the 
equivalent variation. 
But, as I have shown in this section, for the range of high survival 
probabilities relevant for the valuation of "statistical deaths," the e z  
a n t e  valuation of life Broome rejects in (1) is the same as the 
equivalent variation Broome advocates in (2). 
